NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS
Version 2.19
20 February 1999
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There are currently five nations considered to be "nuclear weapons nations", an internationally recognized status conferred by the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In order of acquisition of nuclear weapons these are: the United States of America, Soviet Union/Russia, United Kingdom, France, and China. In actual fact, several more nations have developed nuclear weapons but do not publicly admit to having deployed them (in particular India, Israel, and Pakistan). Oddly enough, despite the decision of India and Pakistan to openly conduct weapons tests and declare themselves nuclear weapon states, they still have not acknowledged the possession of an actual deployed arsenal. Because of this, and the incidental fact that no other nation yet recognizes India or Pakistan as a nuclear power, I am retaining them as "suspect states" for the time being. The three smaller Soviet successor states that inherited nuclear arsenals (Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus) have now relinquished all nuclear warheads which have been removed to Russia.
The five nation nuclear "club" is codified in international law by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) signed in 1970. This treaty declares that only the five nations mentioned above may lawfully possess nuclear weapons, but that all other nations may not be prohibited from acquiring peaceful nuclear technology. It also specifies that the five nuclear powers must seek to reduce and eliminate their arsenals as quickly as possible. No nation has admitted deploying a nuclear arsenal since this date, indicating that it has successfully stigmatized nuclear weapons acquisition. Also no signatory to the pact has yet successfully acquired nuclear weapons after joining NPT. It has not however dissuaded several nations from pursuing these weapons, in some cases successfully. At present, about 178 of the 185 member nations of the UN have signed the treaty. Holdouts include: India, Israel, and Pakistan; all of whom are believed to have nuclear weapons capability, if not actual weapons. Some nations who are parties to the treaty have pursued, or believed to be pursuing weapons are: Iraq, North Korea, Libya, and Iran. South Africa, which recently admitted to having developed an arsenal in the 1980s, has destroyed the arsenal and has since signed the pact.
It should be noted that although Iraq made substantial progress in pursuing nuclear weapons while a member of NPT, no NPT safeguarded facilities contributed to this effort. In fact, no safeguarded facility has ever been shown to contribute to a nuclear weapon effort after having been placed under safeguards (other than to simply increase the technical experience of the operating nation). It is only through secret programs, conducted entirely outside NPT, that nations have been able to pursue nuclear weapons. While the NPT regime is scarcely foolproof, it has been effective in preventing the diversion of civilian nuclear technology and facilities placed under safeguards.
Four nations that came into existence with the breakup of the Soviet Union inherited nuclear weapons: Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. It was agreed by these nations that Russia would be the designated successor to the Soviet Union under NPT. All have now signed the NPT, and all nuclear warheads have been removed to Russian soil.
The NPT was originally of limited duration, its initial 25 year period expired in 1995. The NPT Review and Extension Conference was held in New York from 17 April to 12 May, 1995. Of the 178 signatories, 175 attended. More than half of the signatories (111) sponsored renewal, this time indefinitely instead of a limited duration. As a result of majority sponsorship, the treaty extension was enacted without a formal vote. Three resolutions were also adopted that reaffirmed, clarified, and strengthened the basic NPT approach. Three signatories to the original pact, such as Iran, opposed extending the pact at all and boycotted the proceedings.
There is a non-treaty alliance called the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to which most industrialized countries belong. This organization restricts the access of dual-use technology to countries suspected of pursuing nuclear arms.
Other treaties restricting nuclear arms include:
Antarctic Treaty
Signatories: 40 nations (1994)
Date: 4 August 1963
Prevents military use of Antarctic including stationing or testing nuclear weapons
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
Signatories: U.S., USSR, UK
Date: 4 August 1963
Prohibits nuclear tests above ground, under water, or in space.
Outer Space Treaty
Signatories: 93 nations (1994)
Date: 27 January 1967
Prohibits the intorduction of nuclear weapons into space.
Treaty of Tlatelolco
Signatories: USA and all of South America (26 nations)
Date: 1967
Bans nuclear weapons from South America.
Limited Test Ban Treaty
Signatories: 120 nations (1994)
Date: 1968
Prohibits nuclear tests above ground, under water, or in space.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
Signatories: 186 nations (April 1997)
Date: 1 July 1968, renewed indefinitely 11 May 1995
Prohibits the development or transfer of nuclear weapons or related technologies by and to non-weapon holding states. As of October 1998 the principal non-signers are Israel, India, Pakistan, and Cuba.
Seabed Treaty
Signatories: 88 nations (1994)
Date: 1971
Prohibits deployment of weapons of mass destruction on the the sea floor beyond the 12-mile coastal sovereignty limit.
SALT I (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks I)
Signatories: U.S., USSR
Date: 26 May 1972
Placed limits on arsenals for both signatories, no destruction of existing arsenals is called for. Duration was until 3 October 1977, but both nations agreed to continue to abide by its limits.
Threshold Test Ban Treaty
Signatories: U.S., USSR
Date: 1974
Restricted underground nuclear tests to 150 kilotons.
SALT II (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II)
Signatories: U.S., USSR, UK
Date: 18 June 1979 (never ratified)
Placed tighter limits on arsenals, some weapon destruction is required to meet them.
South Pacific Nuclear Free-Zone (Roratonga) Treaty
Signatories: 11 nations (1994)
Date: 1985
Prohibits testing, deployment, or acquisition of nuclear weapons in the South Pacific.
Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty
Signatories: U.S., USSR
Date: 8 December 1987
Eliminated short and medium range nuclear missiles. All such weapons were destroyed.
START I (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks I)
Signatories: U.S., USSR
Date: 1991 (went into effect 5 December 1994)
Reduces arsenals by about 30%. The original signatory USSR has since dissolved, and the states of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and recently Ukraine have endorsed the treaty by signing the START I Protocol. As a result of Ukraine's joining NPT, the treaty went into effect in December 1994.
START II (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks II)
Signatories: U.S., Russia
Date: 1993; U.S. Senate ratification 1996, unratified by Russian Duma
Reduces deployed (active duty) arsenals of both the U.S. and Russia to 3000-3500 warheads by 2003 and bans MIRVed ICBMs (but not SLBMs). No warheads are actually required to be destroyed. This treaty was finally ratified by the U.S. Senate on 26 Jan. 1996 by a vote of 87-4. It now requires only the approval of the Russian Duma to go into effect. A rider attached by the Senate prohibits compliance with treaty terms unless it formally goes into effect. U.S. planning for stockpile management accordingly assumes maintenance of the higher START I levels for the indefinite future.
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
Signatories: 150 (as of 24 September 1998)
Date: 10 September 1996
This treaty was intended to ban all nuclear tests (based on a negotiated definition of "nuclear test") by all nuclear weapon possessing states (declared or undeclared). Tests by current non-weapons states is already banned by the NNPT. After several years of work, treaty negotiations conducted under the auspices of the 61-nation Conference on Disarmament in Geneva earlier this year successfully enlisted support by all five declared nuclear powers. The final draft, proposed by Dutch negotiator Ramaker in June, required signature by the non-declared weapon states: India, Pakistan, and Israel, for the treaty to go into effect. India, a supporter of the CTBT concept for many years, came out in open opposition to the final draft - declaring that it could not sign the treaty unless it contained a time table for all nuclear powers to destroy their arsenals (a requirement not directly connected with the purpose of the treaty - banning tests). It quickly became apparent that India's 11th-hour opposition was total - that it proposed to use all available means to obstruct the treaty. Since the ground rules for the Conference required unanimous support for treaty approval, India's opposition led to the abandonment of treaty negotiations on 22 August.
The other states however cast about to find an alternate avenue of treaty approval, and Australia offered to submit the treaty directly to the UN General Assembly for approval. On 9 September a resolution calling for approval was introduced into the UN General Assembly by Australia, and it was approved by voice vote the next day. It was opened for signature Tuesday, 24 September when President Clinton followed by the foreign ministers of the four other declared nuclear powers -- Russia, China, Britain and France -- all signed.
As of 24 September 1998, 21 of the 150 signatory nations have also ratified the treaty. The CTBT will not enter into force, though, until all 44 countries with nuclear reactors have signed and ratified it. Of these states, 41 have signed (as of 24 September 1998), including France and the United Kingdom. The three remaining states were India, North Korea, and Pakistan. At the time of this writing, both India and Pakistan reamin ambivalent to signing in the wake of their May 1998 nuclear test series. Pakistan has indicated a willingness to do so, but has stated that it would not agree to the pact unless India does also. India continues to complain of problems with the treaty and claims to accept it in principle, but has made no commitment to sign it. The treaty requires a conference to decide how to accelerate the ratification process should India and others still refuse to join the pact, this conference is now scheduled for September 1999.
Pres. Clinton transmitted the treaty to the U.S. Senate in September 1997, but action to ratify it has not yet been taken. But in any case the United States will not deposit the ratification papers until all the nuclear powers as well as those suspected of having or close to having a bomb -- India, Pakistan and Israel -- are ready to do so.
In the game of comparing nuclear arsenal sizes a number of different methods of measurement can be used. The most popular are the number of warheads, and the total megatonnage of the arsenal. Number of warheads is meaningful when each warhead is large enough to destroy the target it is used against. Targets large enough to require many warheads are relatively few in number, even if the warheads are small (as nuclear weapons go), so warhead number is a fairly good indicator of the effective arsenal size. Megatonnage provides a more direct measure of the gross destructive power of the arsenal, and is especially important for estimating long range effects (like fallout). Since the destructive potential of a nuclear weapon is not necessarily proportional to its size, an alternative to total megatonnage has been proposed called equivalent megatonnage. The equivalent megatonnage of a warhead is its yield in megatons raised to the two-thirds power: Y^(2/3). This metric assumes that blast is the important destructive effect, as it is against most structures. The area affected by the thermal flash is directly proportional to size however, and this casualty producing effect thus dominates in large weapons.
An additional complication in discussing arsenal sizes with respect to the United States and Russia is that these nations are currently "building down" from their bloated Cold War arsenals. Both nations thus have large numbers of superfluous weapons that have yet to be dismantled, but are not part of their official arsenals. I have not included inventories of these retired weapons (mainly because data is unavailable), but these weapons do still exist and could be put back into service on short notice if the decision to do so were made. Even after dismantlement, the expensive nuclear materials will still exist, often in the form of fabricated weapons components, and manufacturing new weapons from them could be undertaken relatively rapidly.
7.2.1 United States of America
On 1 October 1998 a new SIOP (Single Integrated Operational Plan), known as SIOP-99 went into effect. The SIOP is the comprehensive policy guidance for employing nuclear weapons. SIOP-99 was the first new operational plan since SIOP-81 was enacted at the beginning of the Reagan Era, and was drafted in response to Presidential Decision Directive 60, signed by President Clinton in November 1997.
Since the invention of nuclear weapons, the U.S. has built about 70,000 warheads, and dismantled about 58,000 of them with most of the nuclear materials being recycled into new weapons. The U.S. currently has about 12,500 weapons in existence, but only 8700 (approx.) are in active service. The remaining 3800 or so are retired weapons either awaiting dismantlement, making up part of the inactive reserve, or both. Some counts give somewhat lower numbers for operational weapons (e.g. 7200), but the weapons making up this differential are simply "in storage", have not been transferred to reserve status, and are in full operational condition. At its numeric peak in 1967, the U.S. arsenal had some 32,500 warheads.
The U.S. has produced no new nuclear warheads in the past eight years (the last fissile bomb core was fabricated in December 1989, the last weapon was assembled 31 July 1990). The U.S. is currently dismantling a large part of its existing nuclear arsenal, and has no plans at present for building any new nuclear weapons, or any new strategic delivery systems. Existing warheads have been modified however, creating for example the B61 Mod-11 tactical bomb, and remanufacturing of existing warheads to extend their service life is expected. If START II is implemented, by 2007 the U.S. plans to have about 4450 warheads in service (the last time there were fewer than this was in 1957 when 5828 warheads existed) with a combined hedge stockpile and inactive reserve of an additional 5000 warheads. The hedge stockpile will contain fully operational weapons that are kept in storage away from their delivery systems (so that they are not immediately available), there are currently no weapons assigned to this category. The inactive reserve contains weapons that are intact but not in operational condition. Extensive work may be required to return an inactive weapon to service (e.g. expansion of tritium production facilities, followed by stockpiling of additional tritium; modification of inactive warheads to mate with current delivery systems, etc.). 350 W-84 warheads are currently assigned to the inactive reserve.
On 1 March 1995, President Clinton declared 212.5 tonnes of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium to be excess to national security needs. Since that time additional information about the amount, locations, and forms of this material has been released. The excess plutonium (38.2 tonnes) is stored at 10 locations in Washington, Idaho, Colorado, New Mexico (two locations), Texas, Ohio, New York, Tennessee and South Carolina. The HEU (174.3 tonnes) is stored at six locations in Washington, Idaho, Colorado, New Mexico, Texas and South Carolina. It is expected that the HEU will be blended with natural uranium to produce some 7000 tonnes of civilian power plant fuel over 8-10 years. About 10 tonnes of HEU has already been placed under international safeguards at the Oak Ridge Y-12 site.
The excess HEU consists of 33 tonnes of >92% enrichment material (originally used or intended for weapon primary cores), and 142 tonnes of 20-92% enrichment material (much of it used or intended for thermonuclear secondaries). No HEU for weapons use has been produced since 1964, and production of HEU for use in naval reactors ended in 1991 with future needs to be met from the stockpile.
On 6 February 1996 U.S. Dept. of Energy declassified significant additional information about plutonium stocks and their location. It was disclosed that since 1944 the U.S. produced or acquired 111.4 tonnes of plutonium, principally for weapons programs. 93.5% was produced in government reactors, 5% was imported from 14 countries and 1.5% arose from commercial reactors.
89.3% of the 111.4 tonnes produced or acquired remains in the DOE/Department of Defense inventory (99.5 tonnes). The balance consists of plutonium used in the Nagasaki bomb and in weapons tests (3.4 tonnes, 3.1%), waste (3.1%), inventory differences (2.5%), fission and transmutation (1.1%), transfer to foreign countries (0.6%), decay (0.4%) and distribution to the civilian nuclear industry (0.1%).
Of the 99.5 tonnes in current inventory, 85 tonnes is weapons-grade plutonium (less than 7% Pu-240), 13.2 tonnes is "fuel-grade" (7-19% Pu-240) and 1.3 tonnes is reactor-grade (over 19% Pu-240) material. 38.2 tonnes of weapons-grade plutonium was declared excess inventory, and will be disposed of. The remaining 46.8 tonnes of weapons-grade plutonium includes 32 tonnes of plutonium contained in weapons still in the U.S. stockpile, and 5000 pits from disassembled weapons as part of a strategic reserve. Of the excess inventory: 55.8% (26.1 tonnes) is located Pantex - almost all in the form of fabricated weapon pits; 31.2% is located at Rocky Flats, and is thus inaccessible for weapons use at present since the facility has been shut down; most of the remaining 13% is distributed between Hanford, Los Alamos, and Savannah River.
A total of 90.5 tonnes of weapon grade plutonium was produced by the U.S. 54.5 tonnes of this was produced at Hanford, 36 tonnes was produced at Savannah River.
Three countries provided the bulk of the foreign-derived material: United Kingdom (5,384 kilograms), Canada (254.5 kg) and Taiwan (79.1 kg). 749 kilograms of plutonium that was transferred to 39 foreign countries between 1959 and 1991 under the U.S. "Atoms for Peace" program. The plutonium was used for a variety of civilian purposes, primarily power reactor development under International Atomic Energy Agency supervision.
The strategic reserve also contains thermonuclear secondary stages from disassembled weapons, in addition to the 5000 pits. These secondaries contain enriched uranium (in the sparkplug and fissile tamper) and lithium-6 deuteride. When weapons are disassembled at Pantex the secondaries are shipped to Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee, where the Y-12 plant that manufactured them is located. Some of the secondaries are dismantled, but others are retained as part of the strategicv reserve. The number retained for this purpose is not known, but may perhaps match the number of pits in the reserve.
Despite the halt in weapons manufacture and testing, and the draw down in weapon stockpiles, the U.S. has expressed no interest in abandoning nuclear weapons (and netiher has any of the other nuclear weapons states). To maintain the existing weapon stockpile, and an infrastructure capable of weapon development, production and testing, an ambitious research and construction program has been developed. This program maintains the level of funds devoted to the nuclear weapons related programs at the DOE at about the same level as during the Cold War. The content of this program has been summarized by the DOE as follows:
Under this program the national weapons laboratories are continuing to devise new weapon designs and modifications. Los Alamos is developing a replacement warhead for Trident II Mk5 reentry vehicle. Lawrence Livermore is studying the reuse of old weapons pits in new weapon designs. Both labs are working on adding state-of-the-art safety features to some weapons that now lack them.
7.2.1.1 Current Nuclear Forces
The U.S. is currently wrapping up an interim consolidation of its strategic forces, a process set in motion by the unilateral demobilization of thousands of nuclear weapons by Pres. Bush on 27 Sept. 1991. A planned force reduction envisioned by the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) to complying with the provisions of the START II treaty, originally to be completed by 5 December 2001 and then extended by Helsinki agreement until the end of 2007, is now on hold indefinitely. As of Feb. 1999 START II has still not been ratified by the Russian Duma and congressional legislation prohibits complying with the START II prescribed force levels until this occurs. If ratification by the Duma occurs within the next few years, meeting the 2007 date will present no difficulty. The U.S. military is on record favoring the introduction of further force reductions -- particularly the planned decommissioning of four submarines -- to save costs regardless of Duma action.
In any case the START I and START II treaties, like the SALT treaties before them, use strategic delivery vehicles and delivery vehicle loadings as the unit of accountability. This practice was originally instituted due to mutual suspicion and secrecy during the Cold War since delivery vehicles could be counted by satellite, and their configurations confirmed by occasional surprise examination. Nuclear weapons (warheads) per se were not counted. This remains true under START I and II, the limits set are calculated in terms of agreed upon counting rules for delivery vehicles and loadings. Thus there are no restrictions placed on the number of actual nuclear weapons, operational or otherwise, that can be stockpiled by either power, and no restrictions on many types of tactical nuclear warheads. Accordingly the 1994 NPR specified that the U.S. will actually maintain an intact stockpile of some 10,500 weapons, known as the Enduring Stockpile, in various stages of readiness even if and when START II goes into full effect. This is an inventory some four times the officially calculated 2000-2500 deployed strategic warhead limit for START II (for START I the level is 3500). Until such time as other treaties are concluded, or a future posture review makes a unilateral revision, this stockpile level will be maintained indefinitely.
There are currently nine warhead types in the Enduring Stockpile. Each of the two national weapons labs is responsible for the stewardship of the warhead types that they developed. Los Alamos National Laboratory is responsible for five warheads - the B61, W76, W78, W80, and W88. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory is responsible for four - the W62, W84, W87, and B83.
ICBMs
The planned START II deactivation of the 50 Peacekeeper missiles is now on hold. Under START II the US intends to rely solely on the Minuteman III as a land-based ICBM, and programs to implement this contingency are continuing. The MM III force is now based at Malmstrom AFB, Montana (200 missiles in the 10th, 12th, 490th, and 564th missile squadrons of the 341st Space Wing); Minot AFB, North Dakota (150 missiles in the 740th, 741st, and 742nd missile squadrons of the 91st Space Wing); and F.E. Warren AFB, Wyoming (150 missiles in the 319th, 320th, and 321st missile squadrons of the 90th Space Wing). Warren also hosts the sole Peacekeeper squadron (50 missiles, of the 400th missile squadron also of the 90th Space Wing). The redeployment of MM III missiles from Grand Forks AFB in North Dakota was completed 3 June 1998. Inactivated silos have been destroyed by explosive demolition as required by START I at MM III bases that were previously closed. On 13 September 1996 the 149th former silo was blown up at Ellsworth AFB, South Dakota; the 150th and last silo at Ellsworth has been nominated as a National Historic Landmark. In December 1997 the silo demolition program was completed at Whiteman AFB, Missouri (still home to some 550 strategic bombs). The fate of the silos at Grand Forks are currently being debated, it has been proposed that some them could used by a National Missile Defense (NMD) system. If the START II treaty goes into force, the MM III force will be downloaded to one warhead each.
The responsibility for maintaining the ICBM force has been contracted out now, to TRW Inc., for a possible 15 year term running through 2012 at a cost of $3.4 billion (less than what the Air Force expected to spend). TRW is also managing the three-part upgrade program for the MM III force. Since the average age of the MM III inventory is already approaching 25 years (last one assembled 11/30/78), a U.S.$5.2 billion program is refurbishing them and extend their life to 2020. The first part of the program has already been completed, in which the MM III launch control centers (LCCs) were upgraded with Rapid Execution and Combat Targeting (REACT) consoles developed for the MX Peacekeeper program. The second part of the program involves upgrading the electronics and guidance system for the Minuteman. Between 1998 and 2002 a total of 652 new guidance units will be produced for the MM III fleet. These guidance units are the same Advanced Inertial Reference System (AIRS) developed for the Peacekeeper and will enhance MM III accuracy to a comparable or better CEP of 100 m. The third part of the program will remanufacture the solid fuel boosters including repouring the solid propellant.
SLBMs
The Ohio class SSBNs are the only ballistic missile submarines still in the U.S. arsenal, all subs belonging to older classes have been decommissioned or converted to other uses. The first Ohio class submarine, the Ohio (SSBN 726) was launched 7 April 1979 and commissioned 11 November 1981. All of the 18 planned boats have now been commissioned. The final boat, the Louisiana (SSBN 743), was commissioned on 6 September 1997. The first 8 Ohio class subs were equipped with the Trident I missile. Starting with the 9th boat, the Tennessee, commissioned in March 1990, subsequent subs have been equipped with the D-5 Trident (Trident II). The Ohio fleet is based at Bangor, Washington (Submarine Group 9, consisting of a single squadron of 8 boats) and Kings Bay, Georgia (Submarine Group 10, consisting of a squadrons No. 16 and 20 each with 5 boats). Currently only Kings Bay supports the Trident II, which reached its full strength of 10 boats with the Louisiana.
Under START II and the NPR the oldest 4 subs would be retired for a fleet of 14, the remaining 4 Trident I boats will be converted to use the Trident II, allowing the Trident I missile to be retired. The first submarine to be retrofitted with the Trident II was the Alaska (SSBN 732) in 1998. The contract for the second upgrade, the U.S.S. Nevada (SSBN 733), of $62.8 million was awarded in January 1999. The retrofit program is to be completed in FY 2005. Bangor is now being equipped to support the Trident II, eventually both bases will support 7 boats each. Trident II procurement continues, now the only U.S. strategic missile production program (five were purchased in the FY99 budget).
Due to the failure of the Russian Duma to ratify START II, the decommissioning of the four oldest Trident II subs had been in doubt. On 5 January 1999 Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. J.L. Johnson, testified to congress that the costs of keeping them is service past their planned decommissioning dates is prohibitive due to the need for costly refueling, remarks later echoed by Secretary of Defense Cohen. It thus now appears that these subs will be decommissioned starting in 2002 regardless of the status of START II.
Under Start I, the Trident II is limited to 8 warheads (its design capability is 14 or more). This lower loading extends its range to over 11000 km. START II will lower the loading to five each, further extending the range. The extended timetable for START II agreed to at Helsinki would require that there be no more than 2160 SLBM warheads (down from the current 3456), or five per missile for a fleet of 18, by the end of 2004, and no more than 1750 by the end of 2007. The patrol rate (proportion of fleet on patrol at any time) is little changed from the Cold War -- 9 or 10 boats are on patrol at any time. Usually four boats are on "hard alert", that is in their patrol area and within range of all their targets. The other boats are on "modified alert" which means in transit, going to or returning from patrol, and are available for combat although with poorer target coverage. The U.S. Navy disclosed early in 1998 that the actual patrol loading is an average of 5 warheads per missile (thus 480 warheads are kept on hard alert), perhaps for the range advantage provided.
Bombers
The B-1B Lancer has been converted to a conventional bombing role and by the end of 1997 had been phased out as part of the U.S. strategic nuclear forces. They can still carry nuclear weapons (both bombs and crusie missiles) however and can be quickly returned to strategic nuclear duty. Of the original 100 B-1Bs 5 have crashed, leaving a force of 95.
The B-52 Stratofortress force is has been scaled back to a total fleet of 93 planes, all of them B-52Hs (out of an original 104 H models). Despite its age (the last was delivered in October 1962) the B-52H airframe is estimated to be good for service at least to 2030 (this is 83 years after the B-52 program's inception!). Plans for retrofits and upgrades (including reengining) of the B-52H are underway. The B-52H force is based at Barksdale AFB, Louisiana and Minot AFB, North Dakota. Barksdale AFB supports the 11th, 20th, and 96th Bomb Squadrons of the 2nd Bomb Wing with a total of 58 B-52Hs. Minot AFB hosts 5th Bomb Wing with 35 planes, two test aircraft are kept at Edwards AFB, California. With the transfer of the B-1B to conventional duty the B-52H is now the only nuclear cruise missile carrying aircraft.
The Northrop Grumman B-2A Spirit continues to slowly enter service, with some delivered aircraft being sent back for upgrades to the current Block 30 standard as deployment proceeds. The 21st and last new production plane was delivered in January 1998. All 21 planes will be converted to the Block 30 standard operational configuration when full deployment is complete in 2000. At the end of 1998 a total of 19 planes were operational. The Block 30 modification provides the B-2 with the ability to carry all types of strategic nuclear bombs (i.e. the B61-7, B61-11, B83, and B83-1 bombs) and a variety of conventional bombs (including the Mk 84), missiles, and other munitions. The ACM and ALCM cruise missiles are not supported however. The first operational B-2 was delivered to the 509th Bombardment Wing (the same unit that flew the atomic bombing missions against Japan in WWII) at Whiteman AFB, Missouri 17 December 1993. The 509th is composed of the 393rd and 325th Bomb Squadrons. The first full squadron (the 393rd) did not become became operational until 1 April 1997. The 325th became operational on 8 January 1998. In March 1998 the B-2s participated in their first major exercise when they deployed to Andersen AFB, Guam for 10 days.
DELIVERY SYSTEMS ENTERED RANGE PAYLOAD CEP WARHEAD NUMBER
SERVICE (km) (kg) (m) AND TYPE
ICBM
LGM-30G Minuteman III Mk 12 1970 13000 1150 300 3 x W62
Mk 12A 1979 13000 1150 200 3 x W78
LGM-118A Peacekeeper (MX) 1986 13000 3950 100 10 x W87-0
SLBM/SUBMARINE
UGM-96A Trident I C4 1979 7000+ 1500 500 8 x W76
UGM-133A Trident II D5 Mk-4 1990 7-11000 2800 8 x W76
Mk-5 1992 7.4-11000 2800 100 8 x W88
Ohio Class Submarine 1981 24 x Trident I/II
AIRCRAFT
B-52H Stratofortress 1961 11-14000 25000 10 20 x ALCM/ACM/
100 B61/83 bombs
B-1B Lancer* 1986 11000 10 20 x ALCM/ACM/
100 B61/83 bombs
B-2A Spirit 1994 11000+ 20000 100 16 x B61/83 bombs
CRUISE MISSILES
AGM-86B ALCM 1981 2500 110 10 1 x W80-1
AGM-129 ACM 110 10 1 x W80-1
*No longer deployed in the strategic nuclear role, but can be reactivated.
U.S. STRATEGIC FORCES: DECEMBER 1998
WEAPON
DESIGNATIONS LAUNCHER WARHEAD LOADING WARHEAD TOT. YIELD
NUMBER NUMBER x Mt NUMBER Mt Equiv Mt
ICBM
Minuteman III Mk 12 200 3 x 0.17 600 102 184
Mk 12A 300 3 x 0.335 900 327 470
Peacekeeper (MX) 50 10 x 0.30 500 150 224
SLBM/SUBMARINE
Trident I C4 192 8 x 0.10 1536 154 331
Trident II D5 Mk-4 192 8 x 0.10 1536 134 290
Mk-5 48 8 x 0.475 384 182 234
Ohio Class Submarine (18) 24 x Trident I/II
AIRCRAFT
Active/Total
B-52H 44/93 20 x 0.15/0.3/1.2
B-52H and B-2A force combined: 1750 959 1209
B-2A Spirit 19/21 16 x 0.30/1.20
GRAND TOTAL 1085 (active) 7206 2008 2942
U.S. OPERATIONAL STOCKPILE: JULY 1998
This stockpile includes all weapons actually deployed on delivery vehicles, all weapons that are certified and kept ready for use, and a modest set of certified spares that are used to replace ready-for-use weapons when these are taken off duty for inspection or maintenance.
As of July 1998, the active U.S. stockpile consists of the following weapons:
WARHEAD/WEAPON FIRST YIELD (Kt) USER NUMBER TOTAL YIELD (MAX)
PRODUCED Mt Equiv. Mt
STRATEGIC WEAPONS
B61-7 Bomb 10/66 0.3 to 340 AF 610* 207 297
B61-11 Bomb 1/96 0.3 to 340 AF 50 17 24
B83/B83-1 Bomb 6/83 low to 1200 AF 600** 720 678
W76 for Trident I C4 6/78 100 Navy 3200 320 689
W88 for Trident II D5 9/88 475 Navy 400 190 244
W62 for Minuteman III 3/70 170 AF 610 104 187
W78 for Minuteman III 8/79 335 AF 915 308 441
W87-0 for Peacekeeper 4/86 300 AF 525 158 235
W80-1 for ALCM 12/81 5 to 150 AF 400 60 113
W80-1 for ACM ?/90 5 to 150 AF 400 60 113
NON-STRATEGIC WEAPONS
B61-3/4/10 Tactical Bomb 3/75 0.3 to 170 AF/NATO 750 128 230
W80-0 for SLCM*** 12/83 5 to 150 Navy 320 48 90
GRAND TOTAL 8780 2320 3341
* 310 of these are in storage.
** 120 of these are in storage.
*** All are stored ashore.
The Hedge and Reliability Replacement Stockpiles
Any functional nuclear weapon that is not in active service is available for use in principle. Most or all of the dwindling backlog weapons now awaiting dismantlement (about 1500 in mid-1998) are probably functional so any of them could be reactivated on short notice. There are two defined classes of warheads that are not on active duty, but will be retained indefinitely as part of the U.S. Enduring Stockpile - the hedge stockpile, and the reliability replacement stockpile. As weapons are taken off operational status over the next several years, they will be placed in one of these two stockpiles instead of being dismantled.
Warhead Retirements
At the end of 1990 the U.S. held some 21,000 operational warheads, plus another 750 retired warheads that were awaiting dismantlement (due to the manufacture of new weapons in the 80s, relatively little effort had been spent on dismantling old ones). In 1990 weapon manufacture ceased, a change that was not entirely intentional but was forced upon the DOE by safety problems at its Rocky Flats and Savannah River plants. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and Pres. Bush's decision to begin reducing U.S. nuclear forces in September 1991, the whole system was put into reverse and reduction and dismantlement became the primary activity. Since that time some 10,500 warheads have been dismantled, and another 1,500 await dismantlement (as of mid-1998) -- a process to be completed by September 2002. As of mid-year 1998 there were approximately 1500 weapons awaiting dismantlement of three types -- the W56 (Minuteman II), the W69 (SRAM) and the W79 (203mm [8 inch] artillery shell). Most of the weapons have been dismantled at the Pantex Plant, some that contained HEU as the sole fissile material were dismantled at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant.
Pantex Weapon Dismantlements
FISCAL YEAR NUMBER OF WEAPONS
1 Oct to 30 Sept
1990 1151
1991 1595
1992 1303 (Y-12 dismantled another 553)
1993 1556
1994 1369
1995 1393
1996 1064
1997 498
TOTAL 10482
Disassemblies of Warheads by Type
FY 1990-1997*
Warhead/Weapon Type Number
B28 Bomb 624
B43 Bomb 258
W44 ASROC 104
W48 155 mm shell 759
W50 Pershing 1A 160
B53 Bomb 28
W54 SADM 145
W55 SUBROC 160
W56 Minuteman II 1
B57 Bomb 2242
B61-0, B61-2, B61-5 Bombs 1159
W68 Poseidon SLBM 2468
W69 SRAM 60
W70 Lance 1170
W71 Spartan ABM 39
W79-0, W79-1 203mm shells 3
*Does not include disassemblies of types currently in the stockpile.
7.2.1.2 Existing Weapon Infrastructure
Most of the weapons production infrastructure that was constructed during the Cold War has been (or will soon be) shut down, much of it is being dismantled. Plans are now being formulated to transfer various production and maintenance functions to other facilities as needed, mostly to the U.S. national laboratories: Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Lawrence Livermore Natational Laboratory (LLNL), and Sandia National Laboratory (SNL). With the termination of weapons tests and production the role of the laboratories have been redefined to be "stockpile stewardship" - maintaining the safety and reliability of the existing stockpile.
All manufacture of nuclear materials for weapons has been halted. There is now a stockpile surplus of U-235, Pu-239, and enriched lithium deuteride.
Tritium has not been produced in the United States since 1988, when the government shut down its last weapons reactor at the Savannah River Site in Aiken, S.C. Weapon retirements will offset tritium decay in stockpile weapons so that no new tritium production will be needed to support the NPR defined post-START II arsenal until 2011 (allowing a 5 year reserve). Since START-II has not been approved by the Russian Duma though, the DOE is required by congress to continue support a START I-sized arsenal indefinitely. This larger arsenal will require replacement tritium by 2005 (again allowing for a reserve). Planning to develop a new tritium production capability resulted in a decision announced Dec. 1998 by DOE Sec. Richardson to begin producing tritium in the commercial Watts Bar nuclear plant operated by the Tennessee Valley Authority near Knoxville, Tenn with the TVA's Sequoyah nuclear plant outside Chattanooga as a backup. This is the first time a civilian commericial facility has been designated for use in producing nuclear weapons materials in the U.S.
There are two nuclear weapon design labs - LANL and LLNL. Each lab is responsible for supervising and maintaining the weapons it designs. Currently the labs are responsible respectively for the following weapons:
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL)
This weapon design lab competes with Los Alamos. It was established June 1952 near Livermore California and has always operated under a contract with the University of California Board of Regents. The 12.2 square mile facility employed 7,800 people on 25 Nov 1995.
LLNL conducts R&D activities associated with all phases of the nuclear weapons life-cycle, as well as research on non-proliferation, arms control and treaty verification technology. Facilities include the High Explosive Application Facility (HEAF), a tritium facility, the NOVA laser used for Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) research, and the Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation (AVLIS) plant. It is currently planned to be the site for the National Ignition Facility (NIF), a new ICF laser facility
Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL)
Opened in 1943 to design atomic bombs as part of the Manhattan Project, Los Alamos has always been operated under a contract with the University of California Board of Regents. This 43.0 square mile facility employed 7,987 people on 25 Nov 1995.
Los Alamos National Laboratory originally manufactured pits in small numbers for weapons tests at its TA-55 (Technical Area-55) plant. This four acre facility is currently the only full-function plutonium handling facility in the U.S. It opened in April 1978 at a cost of $70 million, and houses 400 scientists and engineers. The 150,000 square foot PF-4 (Plutonium Facility-4) is the actual plutonium processing area of TA-55.
Plans are now for it to begin production for weapon stockpile use in 1997 (with one W88 pit), increasing to 50 pits/yr by 2000. Los Alamos will support stockpile maintenance by requalifying 100 pits a year (this implies a remanufacturing lifecycle of nearly 100 years for all active weapons, and nearly 50 years for requalification).
Until FY 1984 Los Alamos had the capability to fabricate and assembly nuclear weapon test devices. This function was terminated due to persistent security problems, and is now handled by the Nevada Test Site.
Nevada Test Site (NTS)
Located 65 miles from Las Vegas, NTS was established as a nuclear weapon test range in 1951 with its first nuclear test (January 27, 1951). The last nuclear test was on 23 September 1992. A total of 928 total tests (100 atmospheric, 828 underground) are known to have been conducted there. The 1,350 square miles facility employed 4,901 people on 25 Nov 1995.
NTS is currently the only U.S. facility capable of manufacturing nuclear explosive devices. With U.S. nuclear explosion tests permanently terminated, its function has shifted to sub-critical tests with high explosives and fissile material in enclosed test chambers. In mid-1993, construction was completed on the $100 million Combined Device Assembly Facility, a 100,000 square foot building within a highly secured 22 acre portion of the test site. The facility includes five high explosives containment cells, called "Gravel Gerties," three weapon assembly bays, two radiographic areas and storage bunkers.
Pantex Plant
This 16.6 square miles facility, located near Amarillo, Texas, has long been the sole facility for the assembly/disassembly of nuclear warhead and bombs. It has not produced any weapons for nine years, the last new nuclear weapon (a W88 warhead) was assembled on 31 July 1990. It is now performing dismantlement operations only, along with a modest evaluation program that involves disassembling and reassembling about 60 warheads a year for stockpile reliability purposes. By 2000, when the current backlog of weapons has been dismantled, Pantex will reestablish a modest standby manufacturing and remanufacturing capability. Over the period 1990-1996 Pantex averaged 1347 dismantlements a year. This fell to only 498 in 1997 when a number of accidents, including the cracking of a pit during disassembly, caused all work to halt for a time.
In operation since May 1952, it is run by the Mason and Hanger-Silas Mason Company. It employed 3,348 people on 25 Nov 1995, and remains staffed at close to this number in 1999. Staffing is projected to fall to 1600 in 2003 when the current dismantlement program is completed. Its current annual operating budget is $265 million.
Pantex currently stores pits from disassembled weapons (eventually most or all of these will be moved to a planned facility at SRS). In mid-1998 it had 10500 pits in storage and had upgraded its pit storage capability to 12000. As of mid-year 1998 there were approximately 1500 weapons awaiting dismantlement of three types -- the W56 (Minuteman II), the W69 (SRAM) and the W79 (8 inch artillery shell). When the current backlog of weapons awaiting dismantlement is cleared (planned date September 2002) this storage capacity will be full.
On 6 Feb. 1996, the DOE declared that Pantex holds 21.3 tonnes of weapon-grade plutonium (and 16.7 tonnes of highly enriched uranium) considered excess inventory including planned dismantlements, this represents the plutonium from some 7000 pits. 5000 additional pits, containing 15 tonnes of plutonium, are being retained in the strategic reserve.
Sandia National Laboratory (SNL)
Sandia was established to provide engineering services for the development of nuclear weapons at the end of WWII. Its 11.9 square mile main facility is located inside Kirtland Air Force Base near Albuquerque, New Mexico; it has a 413 acre branch laboratory near Livermore. It is operated by the Lockheed Martin Sandia Corp. and employed 8,527 people on 25 Nov 1995. More recent figures (Jan. 1999) are about 6,600 people in Albuquerque and another 900 in Livermore.
SNL has taken over production responsibility for neutron initiators from the now closed Pinellas Plant, and a contingency capacity to produce thermal batteries, where they were originally manufactured. Equipment has been transferred from the Pinellas plant and installed at Sandia and personnel have also been moved from the Pinellas plant. The first thermal battery production was expected in 1998 and delivery of the first Sandia-produced neutron initiator in 1999. At full capacity Sandia expects to be able to produce 500 neutron initiators per year.
Savannah River Site (SRS)
Located near Aiken, South Carolina, Savannah River was established to be the primary production site of nuclear materials for weapons in 1952 at the height of the Cold War. This capability has now been completely shut down. The 300 square mile facility contains deactivated production facilities occupying 16 square miles. It employed 16,655 people on 25 Nov 1995. Its current weapon-related work focuses on tritium handling, and managing the radioactive waste left over from the production of plutonium and tritium.
In Dec. 1998 DOE Sec. Richardson also announced that a new $500 million plant to disassemble the pits (plutonium cores) of nuclear bombs would be built at Savannah River. The facility will disassemble nuclear pits and convert the recovered plutonium metal to an oxide form suitable for disposition. Disposal methods would include fabricating the plutonium oxide into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel, which would be burned in existing domestic reactors, and immobilization of the plutonium in ceramic surrounded by vitrified high level waste. The DOE is currently conducting a demonstration of a prototype pit disassembly and conversion system at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The demonstration, which involves dismantling of pits over a two-to-three year period, provides information for designing and operating the full-scale pit disassembly and conversion facility. The full-scale facility is to be designed and constructed over 1999-2004, with production operations beginning in 2005. Up to 50 tonnes of plutonium is expected to be disposed of by this facility. Construction and operation of the full-scale facility is contingent on reaching agreement with Russia on plutonium disposition.
Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR)
Located at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, this was one of the two original production sites for nuclear weapons material established by the Manhattan Project, the selection of this site was on September 19, 1942 (code named Site X) was in fact the first major decision taken as part of the Project. The reservation covers 55.1 square miles and has three main facilities located on it - the 4.5 square mile Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), the 1.3 square mile Y-12 Plant, and the 2.3 square miles K-25 Plant. It is currently operated by Lockheed Martin Energy Research Corporation and employed 14,639 people as of 9/30/97. Its 1997 budget was $1.1438 billion (not including DOE's Oak Ridge Operations Office).
Originally the K-25 and Y-12 plants both produced enriched uranium for the Manhattan Project. Later the function of Y-12 was switched to manufacturing materials for thermonuclear weapons (enriched lithium-6) and the thermonuclear secondaries themselves. It has also held the responsibility for fabricating enriched uranium components for weapons. It now has responsibility for dismantling secondaries from disasembled weapons, and maintains custody of U.S. stocks of weapons grade enriched uranium, and the reserve stockpile of secondaries that are kept intact. ORR also produces weapon components to support to support the activities of the design laboratories and the Nevada Test Site and fabricates fuel materials for the naval nuclear reactor program.
Over the years ORR has produced some 483 metric tons of uranium-235, and 442.4 metric tons for nuclear weapons. Currently 189 metric tons of uranium-235 and 3.0 metric tons of low-enriched uranium are stored at the Y-12 Plant, 1.5 metric tons of uranium-235 at the K-25 Plant, and 1.4 metric tons of uranium-235 and some uranium-233 at ORNL. 84.9 metric tons of this uranium-235 declared excess by President Clinton on March 1, 1995.
Other Facilities
Nearly all non-nuclear bomb components are manufactured at the the Kansas City Plant operated by the Bendix Kansas City Division of Allied-Signal. This 136 acre facility (containing 3.2 million square feet of process building space) was opened in 1949 and employed 3,291 on 25 Nov 1995.
The existing U.S. gaseous diffusion enrichment facilities at Paducah, Kentucky, and Portsmouth, Ohio are operated by the United States Enrichment Corporation (established by the Energy Policy Act of 1992). These plants only produce low-enriched uranium. In January 1991, the NRC received an application to construct and operate the nation's first privately owned uranium enrichment facility in Homer, Louisiana. The only facility for producing uranium hexafluoride is the Allied-Signal plant in Metropolis, Illinois.
WEAPON DEPLOYMENT/STORAGE SITES
As of mid-1997 the U.S. had nuclear weapons stored at 26 sites in 15 states and 7 foreign countries (this does not count ballistic missile submarines on patrol in the open ocean). The 1997 figure is a significant decline from a few years ago, and a dramatic one over the last decade when hundreds of sites existed around the world. Several more of these sites are being closed now, or due to be closed over the next few years.
In the early 1990s, shortly after the demobilization of nuclear weapons begun by Pres. Bush, the Pantex Plant in Texas had more U.S. nuclear weapons than any other site in the world, over 5000, although none of them were part of the active stockpile. By mid-1997 this number had declined to only 350, the largest number of nuclear weapons were now being held at Kirtland AFB in New Mexico with 2850. Only 450 of these warheads were operational, 1400 of them slated for dismantling, and another 400 are held as part of the U.S. reserve stockpile. The inactive warheads are held in the 58 storage bays and bunkers of the Kirtland Underground Munitions Storage Complex (KUMSC), a new 300,000 square foot facility opened in 1992 at a cost of $30 million. Because of Kirtland, New Mexico has more nuclear weapons than any other state.
Kings Bay Naval Base in Georgia has more operational nuclear warheads stationed there than any other base in the world with 2000, although a substantial portion of these are on patrol at sea at any given time (also making Georgia the state with the most operational warheads). Second place is Bangor Naval Base in Washington state with 1600. The Air Force base with the most warheads is Nellis AFB in Nevada (home of Area 51) with 1450, second place is F.E. Warren AFB in Wyoming (950).
Only 150 warheads were deployed overseas (not counting ballistic missile submarines on patrol), al of them B-61 tactical thermonuclear bombs based in Europe.
U.S. DEPLOYMENT/STORAGE SITES STATE WARHEADS LOCATIONS New Mexico 2850 Kirtland AFB Georgia 2000 Kings Bay Washington 1600 Bangor Nevada 1450 Nellis AFB Wyoming 950 F.E. Warren AFB North Dakota 805 Minot AFB (805) Montana 600 Malmstrom AFB Missouri 550 Whiteman AFB Texas 520 Pantex Plant (350), Dyess AFB (170) Louisiana 455 Barksdale AFB Nebraska 255 1 site California 175 North Island NAS - San Diego Virginia 175 Yorktown NAS - Norfolk South Dakota 170 Ellsworth AFB Colorado 138 1 site Approx. Total 12700 FOREIGN DEPLOYMENT/STORAGE SITES COUNTRY Germany Buechel, Memmingen, Norvenich, Ramstein (U.S. base) United Kingdom Lakenheath (U.S. base) Turkey Balikesir, Murted, Incirlik (U.S. base) Italy Ghedi-Torre, Aviano (U.S. base) Greece Araxos Netherlands Volkel Belgium Kleine Brogel Europe Total 1507.2.1.3 Planned Nuclear Forces
DELIVERY SYSTEMS: 2007
WEAPON SYSTEM NUMBER WARHEAD NUMBER YIELD (Kt) TOTAL WARHEADS
AND TYPE
ICBM
Minuteman III 450-500 1 x W87-0 300 450-500
SLBM/SUBMARINE
Trident II D5 256 5 x W76 100 1280
80 5 x W88 475 400
Ohio Class 14 24 x Trident I/II - 336 missiles
AIRCRAFT
B-52H Stratofort. 33 12 x W61/W83 10 to 1200 396
33 20 x ALCM/ACM/bomb 5 to 1200 660
B-2A Spirit 20 16 x B-61/83 bombs low to 1200 320
CRUISE MISSILES
ALCM (AGM-86B) 1 x W80-1 5 to 150
ACM 1 x W80-1 5 to 150
PROJECTED STOCKPILE: 2007
OPERATIONAL
WARHEAD/WEAPON FIRST YIELD (KT) USER NUMBER TOTAL YIELD (MAX)
PRODUCED Mt Equiv. Mt
STRATEGIC WEAPONS
B61-7/B61-11 Bomb 10/66 10 to 300 AF 420 126 188
B83/B83-1 Bomb 6/83 low to 1200 AF 500 600 564
W76 for Trident II D5 6/78 100 Navy 1280 128 276
W88 for Trident II D5 9/88 475 Navy 400 190 243
W87-0 for Minuteman III 4/86 300 AF 450-500 150 224
W80-1 for ALCM/ACM 12/81 5 to 150 AF 400 60 113
NON-STRATEGIC WEAPONS
B61(-3,4,10) Tact. Bomb 3/75 0.3 to 175 AF/NATO 600 105 188
W80-0 for SLCM 12/83 5 to 150 Navy 350 53 99
GRAND OPERATIONAL TOTAL* 4450 1412 1895
*Plus an additional 500 spares
INACTIVE RESERVE STOCKPILE
W76 for Trident II D5 6/78 100 Navy 450 45 97
W78 for Minuteman III 8/79 335 AF 900 302 434
W84 GLCM Warheads 10-50 ? 350 18 47
Bombs and cruise missiles 5 - 9000? AF 800 1000? 1000?
GRAND INACTIVE RESERVE TOTAL 2500
Principal sources for the section on the United States are:
The Russian nuclear arsenal remains in an uncertain state of flux due to the direct and indirect consequences of the breakup and economic collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia completed the redeployment of nuclear weapons from the territory of the non-Russian former Soviet republics by November 1996, but now faces severe funding problems for maintaining a standing strategic weapons force. The existing Russian nuclear arsenal, largely built up in the 1970s and early 1980s, is reaching the end of its useful service life. In September 1997 Gen. Vladimir Yakovlev, chief of the Russian strategic rocket forces, stated that 62 percent of Russia's ICBMs are beyond their guaranteed service life. In late November 1998, Anatoly Perminov, chief of the strategic missile force's general staff, put the figure at 58 percent. Remanufacturing the existing weapons as the US is currently doing is costly, and Russia appears to lack the engineering and industrial resources to undertake such an effort. Much of the original industrial base for these weapons was located in now independent former republics, particularly Ukraine. The alternative, which Russia is pursuing, is to to replace existing weapons with new ones. The severe budget crisis makes replacing existing weapons on a one-for-one basis impossible.
Although under the (as yet unratified) Start II treaty Russia is permitted 3500 warheads, Pres. Boris Yeltsin apparently used the proposed Start III levels of 2000-2500 warheads as the basis of stockpile planning at a review held on 6 July 1998, perhaps reflecting an awareness of the impossibility of maintaining larger stockpiles. Most estimates of Russia's likely nuclear forces over the next decade are sharply lower than this however.
A variety of estimates have been bandied about over the last year. Such predictions are of course sensitive to the state of the economy. Prior to the July 1998 review, prominent Russian strategist Lev Volkov estimated that Russia may have only 700 warheads by 2007. Sergei Kortunov, a top Kremlin defense aide, has written that "with a lot of effort" Russia might climb back to 1,000 warheads by 2015. Perhaps the most serious indication of the straits Russia's nuclear forces are in, because of its official imprimatur, came in October 1998. News organizations reported that a secret report to the Russian Duma by First Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Maslyukov, a former top Soviet-era military-industrial planner, had estimated that Russia may well be able to field only 800 to 900 nuclear warheads by 2005.
By contrast, according to the Natural Resources Defense Council in Washington, the Soviet Union in 1990 had 10,779 strategic nuclear warheads (this excludes an estimated 6,000 to 13,000 nonstrategic warheads which have never been covered by arms control treaties.)
The pressure from such hard realities appears to have begun to move the START II treaty, which has been awaiting action by the Russian Communist Party led Duma for 6 years, towards ratification. On 12 November 1998 the Duma finally began consideration of a bill that would have brought START II to a vote. Anger at the December 1998 Operation Desert Fox attacks by the US against Iraq, and then the January 1999 announcement of US intentions for deploying a limited ABM system, has again delayed action however. Despite this no less a figure than the Russian Communist Party leader in the Duma Gennady Zyuganov stated on 26 January that START II could be ratified if the United States guarantees the observance of all the earlier concluded agreements on nuclear missile arsenals reduction and complies with the decisions of the UN Security Council. Reflecting the grim budget realities, Russian officials and Duma members have talked unofficially about revising downward warhead numbers on both sides, even from START III numbers.
The most notable action taken by Russia over the last year towards maintaining its nuclear arsenal was the deployment of the first operational regiment of ten Topol-M ICBMs (designated as either RT-2PM or RS-12M2 and designated SS-27 by NATO). This is the first missile to be built exclusively in Russia.
The first test flight of this missile version was 20 December 1994, it successfully completed its six flight test schedule on 9 December 1998 with a launch from the Plesetsk cosmodrome in northern Russia. The regiment was declared operational by Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev, a former chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces, on 27 December 1998 at a strategic missile base in Tatishchevo, near the Volga River city of Saratov. The first two missiles were actually installed at the base in old SS-19 silos near in December 1997.
The Topol-M is being deployed as a single warhead missile although it is capable of carrying three warheads. It has a range of 10500 km, and is suitable for silo or mobile basing. It has improved reliability and operational features, including an improved road-mobile launcher and turning radius, and succeeds the SS-25 Topol. Like its predecessor it is an inertially guided three-stage solid-fuel missile. The missile's launching weight is 47 tonnes, the payload (warhead weight) is one tonne. The missile's length without the warhead is 17.9 meters, and the maximum diameter of the body is 1.86 meters.
Maslyukov, who is in charge of the Russian military-industrial complex, has stated that the Russian Strategic Missile Force (RVSN) will receive another 10 Topol-M missile systems in 1999, with production reaching 40 a year by the end of 2000, at which time a total of 40 will be in service. In the Soviet era, the Votkinsk factory, which builds the Topol-M in the central Urals mountains, made about 80 missiles a year. According to Maslyukov Russia plans to build 35 to 45 Topol-M ballistic missiles every year starting in 2000. It is believed that a complete force of 500 or so will be deployed some time after 2010 if plans stay on track.
In contrast to other state defence programmes, the Topol-M production program was fully funded in the 1998 budget. Gen. Vladimir Yakovlev, head of the RVSN, said that just to build the Topol-Ms, which cost about $30 million apiece, "will require the concentration of all our resources."
Russia is also working on keeping existing systems in operation as long as practical. To support this effort the RVSN made a successful test launch of an RS-22 ICBM (known as the SS-24 Scalpel by NATO) with multiple warheads from a railway missile system on 10 December 1998. The launch from Plesetsk tested the deployment of 10 warheads and "hit targets at the Kamchatka test site with high precision," according to the Interfax news agency.
Maslyukov has said that Russia must build 35 to 45 Topol-M ballistic missiles every year starting in 2000 and build several nuclear submarines of the Yuri Dolgoruky class, armed with ballistic missiles. It must also modernize its control, early warning and space intelligence systems, he said.
On 27 December it was also announced that a parliament committee is drafting a bill that would guarantee funding to the strategic missile forces until 2010, regardless of the country's economic situation, Interfax reported. The measure would ensure that Russia maintains nuclear parity with the West, according to Roman Popkovich, chairman of the Defense Committee of the State Duma, the lower house of parliament.
A contentious issue currently under discussion within the Russian government is a plan to restructure the command of nuclear forces, an topic which has rarely been discussed in public before. At issue is Defense Minister Sergeyev's recent proposal to establish a single command over all nuclear forces, along the lines of the US Strategic Command. Sergeyev said that on 3 November President Boris Yeltsin initialed a document approving the idea, but there has been stiff resistance from the General Staff. The arguments have been laid out in a series of dueling essays published in Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, a weekly newspaper devoted to military issues.
Currently, control over nuclear weapons passes through the General Staff, which would oversee the various services in combat. Sergeyev has proposed creating a separate organization that would be in charge of all of Russia's nuclear weapons, whether on submarines, long-range bombers or land-based missiles. Sergeyev also has proposed including in the new command the 12th Main Directorate of the Defense Ministry, which is in charge of maintaining the nuclear stockpile.
Sergeyev has said he would like the new command to be headed by his protege, Gen. Vladimir Yakovlev, the current head of the RVSN, who would be elevated to first deputy minister of defense. A source said Sergeyev sees implementation of his plan as urgent because it is unlikely he would serve beyond the expiration of Yeltsin's term, which ends in the summer of 2000. Sergeyev's proposal supports Russia's current national security doctrine, which emphasizes the importance of preserving its nuclear deterrent at a time when conventional forces are decaying.
Sergei Rogov, director of the Institute for the Study of the United States and Canada, said the advantage of Sergeyev's proposal is that it would provide a "substantial simplification of command and control" for the Russian nuclear forces as they grow smaller.
But criticism has come from the military's General Staff, which would lose one of its most important functions. The generals have scoffed at the idea of investing more money in a new organization while the military budget is extraordinarily slim. Alexander Lebed, the governor of Krasnoyarsk and a former general, has joined opposition to Sergeyev's plan, which he denounced as "impossible to create." Lebed said, "We must not complicate an already complicated system."
Under the Nunn-Lugar Act, a program named for its originators originated by Senators Richard Lugar and Sam Nunn, D-Ga., the United States has spent more than $400 million each year since 1991 to help Russia dismantle its old Soviet weapons, and plans to allocate an additional $440 million in 1999.
Under the 'swords for plowshares' deal signed in January 1994 to dispose of excess weapons material, the U.S. Government will purchase 500 tonnes of HEU from Russia for dilution, for US$11.9 billion. Under the Russian-U.S. agreement the United States Enrichment Corporation will purchase a minimum of 500 tonnes of military HEU over 20 years, commencing with 10 tonnes for the first five years and not less than 30 tonnes per year thereafter. The weapons-grade is to be blended down to 4.4% U-235 in Russia and the Russians intend to use 1.5% U-235 for this, to minimize the levels of U-234 in the product. In the short term the military uranium is likely to be blended down to 20% U-235, then stored. In this form it is not usable for weapons.
The blending down of 500 tonnes of military HEU will result in about 15,000 tonnes of low-enriched uranium over 20 years. This is equivalent to about 150 000 tonnes of natural uranium, or approximately three times western world demand in 1993. The dilution of 10 tonnes of military HEU per year for the first five years will displace approximately 3,700 tonnes of uranium oxide production per year, equivalent to output from a medium to large uranium mine. By 2000 the dilution of 30 tonnes of military HEU will displace about 11,200 tonnes of uranium oxide mine production per year which represents approximately 20% of the western world's uranium requirements.
In 1995 the U.S. Enrichment Corporation received its first shipments of low-enriched uranium from Russia (186 tonnes), derived from six tonnes of weapons-grade material. The first shipment of this to a customer, valued at US$145 million, was made in November, and is presumably now generating electricity.
On 27 April 1997 Nuclear Energy Minister Viktor Mikhailov announced that Russia had dismantled almost half of its arsenal, removing nearly 400 tonnes of HEU in the process.
7.2.2.1 Current Nuclear Forces
Over the last two years there has been little change in the formal size of the Russian nuclear forces although their effective size has shrunk slightly due to continuing system deterioration.
Current strategic plans are to manufacture the Topol-M (SS-27) to replace most of the ICBMs currently in service. Under START-II Russia can retain SS-19s (downloaded from six warheads to one) and SS-25s in service. The SS-19 is a relatively old system (some have now been in service 20 years) and probably will have to be retired before 2007. By that time the Russian ICBM force would likely consist of 320 SS-27s, and as many as 360 SS-25s, all with single warheads.
The RVSN is organized into four missile armies with headquarters at Vladimir, Omsk, Orenburg, and Chita. There are 19 missile bases, each consisting of a separate missile division. The RVSN's 6th Main Directorate is responsible for nuclear security and custody. As of mid-1998 there were 754 missles of four basic types: 180 SS-18s, 168 SS-19s, and 10 SS-24s in underground silos; 36 SS-24s on railroad cars, and 360 road-mobile SS-25s. 10 silo based SS-27s were added at the end of 1998.
The Russian strategic ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) force officially consists of 42 boats of six types (Yankee-I, Delta-I, Delta-II, Delta-III, Delta-IV, and Typhoon), but only boats of the latter three classes are believed to be in actual operation so the true force is much smaller. The Russian Navy only counted 26 submarines as actually operational in mid-1998. Of six Typhoon ICBM-equipped subs built in the last decade, only three are still operational due to technical problems requiring overhaul on the three oldest boats, reducing the effective count to only 23 or so. According to Bruce Blair of the Brookings Institute only only two were on patrol at at time, the remainder are likely kept ready in port as static (but highly vulnerable) missile launchers. By 2003 only 10-15 boats are likely to remain in service -- 3 Typhoons, 7 Delta-IVs, and some Delta-IIIs.
There is a new SLBM missile under development, but as of the end of 1998 had not yet been test flown. The keel of the first Borey-class ballistic missile submarine was laid in November 1996, one of three planned new subs, but is still under construction and neither of the other two has yet been started. Probably no new subs will enter service before 2003. Under the strategic stockpile review held in July 1997, Yeltsin directed Russian strategic forces to shift to greater emphasis on sea-based missiles by putting half of all warheads on submarines (up from about 30% from today).
Of the three legs of the Russian nuclear arsenal, the bomber force is in the worst state. There are nominally 74 heavy bombers in service in mid-1998: 6 Tu-160 Blackjacks and 68 Tu-95 MS6/MS16 Bears. Of the 6 Blackjacks (built in 1991) only 2 (perhaps as many as 4) are believed to be flight-worthy, plans to purchase the 19 Blackjacks located in Ukraine have collapsed due to lack of funds, and their poor condition. The Blackjack production line was shut down in 1994, but efforts to complete 6 remaining planes are evidently underway, and Russia appears committed to keeping a force of Blackjacks, however small, in service. The older Bears are expected to be retired before 2005.
DELIVERY SYSTEMS
DESIGNATIONS YEAR RANGE (km)/ CEP(m)
NATO RUSSIAN PAYLOAD (kg)
ICBMs
SS-18 M4/M5/M6 Satan RS-20, R-36N Voevoda 1979 11000/8800 250
SS-19 M3 Stiletto RS-18, UR-100NU 1979 9000/4350 300
SS-24 M1/M2 Scalpel RS-22,RT-23U Molodets 1987 10000/4050 200
SS-25 Sickle RS-12M, RT-2PM? 1985 10500/1000 200
SS-27 Topol-M RS-12M2, RT-2PM? 1998 10500/1000 200
SLBM/SUBMARINES
SS-N-18 M1 Stingray RSM-50 1978 6500/1650 400
SS-N-20 M1/M2 Sturgeon RSM-52 1983 8300/2550 500
SS-N-23 Skiff RSM-54 1986 9000/2800 500
AIRCRAFT
Bear H6 TU-95 MS6 1984 13000/
Bear H16 TU-95 MS16 13000/
Blackjack TU-160 1987 12500/
Due to the disordered state of Russian affairs in general, and military affairs in particular, it is difficult to estimate the actual available nuclear forces. The figures given below are the maximum available forces. The actual effective SLBM and aircraft forces are likely to be a fraction of those indicated. At one point during the summer of 1995 only one Typhoon SLBM boat was deployed. Few, if any, Blackjacks are currently operational. Some of the forces that have become unavailable due to maintenance and support problems may eventually be reactivated.
Current Deployment Locations
ICBM
SS-18: Aleysk, Dombarovski, Kartaly, and Uzhur (186 total)
SS-19: ?
SS-24 M1: Bersht, Kostroma, and Krasnoyarsk (12 each)
SS-24 M2: Tatishchevo (10)
SS-25: ?
SS-27: Tatishchevo (10)
(Only 8 of 19 bases listed)
SUBMARINES
Typhoon submarines: Nerpichya, Kola Peninsula (6)
Delta IV submarines: Yagelnaya, Kola Peninsula (7)
Delta III submarines: Yagelnaya, Kola Peninsula (4);
Rybachi, Kamchatka Peninsula (9)
BOMBERS
Bear H16: Mozdok (19)
Ukrainka (17)
Uzin (21 - these Ukrainian aircraft are non operational)
Bear H6: Mozdok (2)
Ukrainka (25)
Uzin (4 - these Ukrainian aircraft are non operational)
Blackjack: Engels Air Base (5)
Zhukovsky Flight Center (1)
Priluki (19 - these Ukrainian aircraft are non operational)
RUSSIAN STRATEGIC FORCES: 1 JULY 1998*
WARHEAD/WEAPON
DESIGNATIONS LAUNCHER WARHEAD LOADING WARHEAD TOT. YIELD (MAX)
NUMBER NUMBER x Mt NUMBER Mt Equiv Mt
ICBMs
SS-18 M4/M5/M6 180 10 x 0.55/0.75 1800 1170 1347
some 1 x 25?
SS-19 M3 168 6 x 0.55 1008 554 677
SS-24 M1 36 10 x 0.55 360 198 242
SS-24 M2 10 10 x 0.55 100 55 67
SS-25 360 1 x 0.55 360 198 242
SLBMS/SUBMARINES
SS-N-18 M1 192/12 subs 3 x 0.50 576 288 363
SS-N-20 M1/M2 80/4 subs 10 x 0.20 800 160 274
SS-N-23 112/7 subs 4 x 0.10 448 45 97
AIRCRAFT
Bear H6 29 6 x AS-15A ALCM/bomb 174 44 69
Bear H16 35 16 x AS-15A ALCM/bomb 560 140 222
Blackjack 6 12 x AS-15B ALCM/ 72 18 29
AS-16 SRAM/bomb
GRAND TOTAL 1236 6258 2870 3629
*10 SS-27 single warhead Topol-M deployed December 1998 not shown
Russia now has nine power stations operating 29 nuclear reactors, with 22 gigawatts of electrical capacity; this represents 12% of total electricity generated in Russia. The Minatom ministry plans to increase total capacity to 28 or 30 gigawatts before 2005.
Russia has four uranium enrichment facilities, in Ekaterinburg, Tomsk, Krasnoyarsk and Angarsk, with a total annual enrichment capacity 20 million SWU. Isotope separation has gone through several stages of development: gaseous dynamic nozzle technology, gaseous diffusion, and gas centrifuge. Russia is currently using 50% of her enrichment capacity for domestic and export production, and is thus aggressively marketing her high technology centrifuge separation capacity.
Principal sources for the section on Russia are:
7.2.3.1 History of British Nuclear Weapon Development
Britain was the first country to seriously study the feasibility of nuclear weapons, and made a number of critical conceptual breakthroughs. The first theoretically sound critical mass calculation was made in England by Frisch and Peierls in Feb. 1940; and from 10 April 1940 to 15 July 1941 the MAUD Committee headed by Tizard worked out the basic principles of fission bomb design and uranium enrichment by gaseous diffusion. The work done by the MAUD Committee was instrumental in alerting the U.S. (and through espionage, the USSR) to the feasibility of fission weapons in WWII. A high level of cooperation between Britain, the U.S., and Canada continued through the war, formalized by the 1943 Quebec Agreement. Britain sent "the British Mission", a team of first rank scientists to work at Los Alamos. The mission made major contributions to the Manhattan Project, and provided the nucleus for British post-war atomic weapons development effort. Among the mission members was William G. Penney who later led the British atomic bomb project.
Immediately after the war, in August 1945, the new Labor government in Britain organized a secret Cabinet committee to establish nuclear policy. Initial decisions focused on establishing nuclear infrastructure and research. In August 1946 the U.K. Air Chief of Staff issued a formal requirement for an atomic bomb. On 6 November 1946 the Atomic Energy Act (McMahon Act) severed close nuclear ties between the U.S. and Britain. On 8 January 1947, a secret committee of six Ministers (headed by P.M. Attlee) decided to proceed with development and acquisition of atomic weapons. This fact was not disclosed at all until 12 May 1948, when an oblique reference was made to atomic weapon development in parliamentary discussions.
The initial sites for Britain's nuclear program were selected in 1946. Harwell, on the Berkshire Downs 12 miles south of Oxford, was selected for the Atomic Energy Research Establishment. This research center was headed by physicist Sir John Crockcroft. Construction began there for Britain's first nuclear reactor, BEPO (Britain Experimental Pile Zero). BEPO went critical on 3 July 1948.
The fissile material production facilities were the responsibility of Christopher Hinton. A site for the first plutonium production reactors and plutonium processing plant was selected at Sellafield on the Irish Sea coast in Cumberland. The site was renamed Windscale, and construction began in September 1947. In October 1950 the first production reactor went critical. The plutonium plant began operation on 25 February 1952, and produced the first plutonium metal 35 days later.
A gaseous diffusion plant was also planned, and the site eventually chosen in Early 1950 was Capenhurst, near Chester. This plant finally began operation in 1953. An extension boosted its annual production capacity to 125 kg of HEU at the end of 1957.
In May 1947 William Penney learned of the decision to build an atomic bomb, and the following month began assembling a team to work on it. The effort suffered initially from disorganization - it was spread over several sites, and lines of authority with other research sites were not clear. By mid 1948 the responsibilities had been settled, and on 1 April 1950 a single site was selected for atomic weapons development at Aldermaston in Berkshire.
Due to the small size and high population density of Britain no suitable sites for atmospheric weapons tests existed. Britain thus sought sites in other countries to test its weapons, finally settling on the Monte Bello Islands in Australia. The plutonium for the first test device was needed by 1 August 1952 to meet the schedule. Because the Windscale plant was not quite able to meet this, some Canadian supplied plutonium was also incorporated into the core. 15 September 1952 the plutonium core for the first British nuclear device, code named Hurricane, left England. On 3 October 1952 Hurricane was detonated in a lagoon off the western shore of Trimouille Island. The bomb was exploded inside the hull of the HMS Plym (1450 ton frigate) which was anchored in 40 feet of water 400 yards off shore. The explosion occurred 2.7 m below the water line.
The British arsenal acquired its first deployed weapon, the Blue Danube plutonium bomb, in November 1953. This weapon was based on the Hurricane device. From a technology standpoint it was probably very similar to the U.S. Mk 4, which went into service in 1949. Like the Mk 4 it had a 60 inch, 32 lens implosion system and used a levitated core suspended within a hollow uranium tamper. Plans at this point called for building up an arsenal of 200 weapons by 1957 so plutonium production was expanded by adding two new dual use (plutonium and electricity) MAGNOX reactors at Calder Hall.
The U.S. had already demonstrated the feasibility of megaton size fission and thermonuclear bombs in October 1952, and by February 1954 the British had drafted requirements to add megaton weapons to their stockpile. The Teller-Ulam design had not been rediscovered by them at this point, and only pure fission designs were initially considered.
From March through May 1954 the UK was permitted by the U.S. to observe the Castle test series at Bikini atoll and use sampling aircraft in the mushroom clouds. This would have provided the British with clear, direct evidence of the high compression produced in the secondary stages by radiation implosion.
Possibly as a direct result of this data, on 16 June 1954 Winston Churchill decided that Britain should go ahead with H-bomb development, that is, to replicate the U.S. achievement (the USSR had not tested a staged thermonuclear bomb at this time).
Due to technical uncertainties a program of parallel development of alternate approaches was undertaken. The primary objectives were to acquire warheads with yields of approximately 1 megaton suitable for both an air dropped bomb, and a lighter one for the Blue Streak medium range ballistic missile (eventually canceled). Secondary objectives were to minimize the use of scarce and expensive fissile material in the designs. To achieve these ends a low-risk pure fission design, multiple boosted fission (Alarm Clock/Layer Cake like) designs, and staged thermonuclear designs were pursued. Since the pure fission bomb would have required 120 kg of U-235 (the entire annual production of Capenhurst, once expansion was complete in 3 years), and was too heavy for missile use, this was an option of last resort.
By mid-December 1955 the increasing international pressure for a halt to atmospheric testing gave further impetus to the parallel programs. It appeared quite possible that the UK might have only a very short window in which it could test megaton class weapons (and demonstrate this capability to the world). The requirement for a multi-megaton weapon had been added by this time, which only a two-stage thermonuclear device could provide. This decision was largely based on political considerations, since the Soviet Union had tested such a device on 22 November 1955.
By this time Britain had developed a pure fission design for the Mark 1 bomb case, and two boosted fission designs using U-235 surrounded by lithium deuteride: Green Bamboo and a smaller and lighter (but less efficient) device called Orange Herald. All were estimated to produce 1 megaton yields. They also had a large two-stage thermonuclear weapon design called Green Granite expected to produce multi-megaton yields (1-4 Mt). Green Bamboo and Green Granite were suitable for the heavy air-dropped bomb, only Orange Herald was suitable for the missile warhead. The Green Bamboo and Orange Herald devices were both quite expensive in fissile material. Green Bamboo required 87 kg of U-235, Orange Herald required 117 kg. Considering annual production was only 120 kg, neither of these devices could be deployed in very large numbers.
Fusion reactions using lithium deuteride fuel were ignited in the Mosaic test series conducted at the Monte Bello test site in the spring of 1956. Mosaic G1 (16 May 1956) produced a 15-20 Kt yield and was apparently a failure. Mosaic G2 (19 June 1956), which produced an unexpectedly high 98 Kt yield, provided data about fast fission of a U-238 tamper by fusion neutrons.
By January 1957 two variant designs had been developed for both Green Granite and Orange Herald. These were a light weight version of Green Granite (suitable for the missile), and a heavy weight version of Orange Herald using the Mark 1 case (too heavy for the missile, but more likely to be successful). Both Green Granite Large and Small (or Short) were expected at this time to produce a yield of about 1 Mt. A modified version of the Red Beard bomb (evidently to produce a higher yield) called Tom was used as the primary for both Green Granite designs.
The Green Granite Small, Orange Herald Small, and a device called Purple Granite which was substituted for Green Granite Large at the last minute (possibly a modified version of it) were ultimately tested in the 1957 Grapple test series at Malden Island in the Pacific. Green Granite Small was detonated in the Grapple 1/Short Granite test on 15 May 1957. Its yield was a disappointing 200-300 Kt, but most of this was from the secondary stage providing proof of principle. Orange Herald Small was tested in Grapple 2/Orange Herald on 31 May 1957 producing 720 Kt (the largest yield from this type of device on record). Surprisingly, Purple Granite produced an even smaller yield in the Grapple 3/Purple Granite test on 19 June 1957, about 150 Kt.
All in all, the series was a mixed success. The rediscovered Teller-Ulam design, and a deployable megaton-class weapon design had both been proven. On the other hand, the H-bomb yields were far below those predicted. During the summer of 1957 the British government announced that it had successfully conducted thermonuclear tests. In his memoirs Prime Minister Harold MacMillan writes "On May 15 came the successful explosion of the first British H-bomb," referring to Grapple 1/Short Granite. This test was certainly an H-bomb, but not a very efficient one.
The next test, Grapple X, was held on 7 November 1957. The bomber squadron was only notified about the test in September, followed by four weeks of intensive training in preparation. Only one device, designated Round C, was tested with a yield of 1.8 Mt. This indicates that Grapple X was a hurriedly prepared and planned operation, intended to test a redesigned Teller-Ulam device following analysis of the disappointing results of the first and third Grapple tests. The high yield shows that the British had achieved mastery of H-bomb design.
Further development work on high yield thermonuclear weapons continued in 1958, with an international test moratorium rapidly approaching. Several high yield tests were conducted:
But an important change was taking place in the UK's relationship with the U.S. which would profoundly change the nature of Britain nuclear weapons program. Previously nuclear cooperation between the two nations had been fitful. During the war cooperation had been very close. A team of British scientists had been deeply involved in weapons design at Los Alamos (the "British Mission"), and the close cooperation had been officially ratified by the Quebec Agreement (1943) and the Hyde Park Memoranda (1944). In 1946 though, the highly restrictive Atomic Energy Act (McMahon Act) had shut down exchanges of information (this had been an important motivating factor in initiating the British nuclear weapons program in the first place).
An amendment of the Atomic Energy Act in 1954 had made limited exchanges possible, and the pressures of the Cold War made the need for cooperation ever more urgent as time passed. Finally in 1958 a major revision to the Act was made (signed into law 2 July) that opened the gates for detailed collaboration. The first meeting under this revised law occurred 25-27 August 1958 in Washington. This brought about considerable understanding of each party in the status of weapons developments by the other side. In the second meeting (15-17 September 1958) at Los Alamos detailed designs of American weapons were passed to the British, including the Mk 28, 44, 45, 47, and 48 warheads and information on the TX-41 and 46 then under development. These were the most sophisticated weapon then available to the U.S.
With this flood of data, backed by numerous tests, and representing weapons that had been engineered to a high state of sophistication and had been manufactured in large numbers, the British abandoned the idea of developing and fielding their own designs. The versatile and compact Mk-28 was quickly adopted as the design for the next British weapon and by November an American team was at Aldermaston discussing Mk-28 weapon manufacturing requirements. The goal was for the first British production unit to be completed by April 1960.
7.2.3.2 History of the British Nuclear Weapon Stockpile
Blue Danube (Mark 1)
This free fall bomb was the first nuclear weapon stockpiled by Britain, going into service in November 1953. It was a pure fission bomb initially using plutonium, but later modified to use a composite plutonium/U-235 core. Tests were also conducted with a uranium only core. It had a nominal yield of 15 Kt. Based on Hurricane, the first UK tested device, it was essentially a lab-built, limited production weapon. From a technology standpoint it was probably very similar to the U.S. Mk 4, which went into service in 1949. Like the Mk 4 it had a 60 inch, 32 lens implosion system and used a levitated core suspended within a hollow uranium tamper. The 5 ft diameter explosive sphere was in a 24 ft long weapon case. This case was almost twice as long as that used by the U.S. in its large diameter fission bombs (10 ft 8 in), which made for a bulkier but more aerodynamically stable weapon.
It was continuously modified, so it existed in a number of "variants", some with yields up to at least 40 Kt. It was tested in Buffalo Round 2 (4 October 1956) and 3 (11 October 1956) with low yield cores providing yields of 1.5 and 3 Kt. Only about 20 were manufactured by early 1958 when production terminated. It remained in service until 1962.
Red Beard
Red Beard was a second generation fission weapon. It was a relatively light weight tactical fission bomb using a tritium boosted plutonium/U-235 composite core. Development began in 1954 and was substantially complete by 1958. Production in significant numbers began in 1959, but it was not operationally deployed until 1961. Red Beard was about 3 feet in diameter, 12 feet long, and weighed 2000 lb. These weights and diameters make it roughly the equivalent of the U.S. Mk-5 or Mk-7 bombs, both of which went into service in 1952 (although these weapons were not boosted). The smaller size made it possible for tactical aircraft to carry it as well as strategic bombers.
It was tested in Buffalo Rounds 1 (27 September 1956) and 4 (22 October 1956) with yields of 15 and 10 Kt respectively. A variable yield of 5-20 Kt has been claimed for this weapon. This device was adapted as the primary for the first British thermonuclear weapons, tested in 1957. Red Beard was in service from 1961 to 1971. A maximum of 80 bombs was in RAF inventory, and about 30 in the Fleet Air Arm stockpile, during the early 1960s.
Violet Club
This interim air dropped bomb had an estimated yield of 500 Kt. The case was very similar to the Mark 1, its weight was 9000 lb. Deployed in early 1958, only five were planned for deployment. The deployed bombs were subsequently converted to Yellow Sun Mk 1 bombs.
The device used in Violet Club was called Green Grass. This device had not been previously tested, and was based on a design prepared for Grapple (but also apparently not tested), although its yield was predicted from devices that were tested in Grapple. Based on this, and the similarity in names, it may be surmised that Green Grass is based on Green Bamboo (bamboo is a type of grass after all). The probable alteration was to reduce the fissile content (to perhaps 75 kg or so) thus making better use of Britain's scant U-235 stockpile. The severe safety problems of this design clearly indicate a high fissile content. The intent would have been to provide a high yield weapon that could be quickly deployed in reasonable numbers (impossible for Orange Herald).
Yellow Sun Mk 1
This was Britain's first deployed "true" H-bomb. Violet Club incorporated fusion fuel but represented an awkward, expensive, inefficient, dead-end design. Yellow Sun Mk 1 employed the radiation implosion technology demonstrated during Grapple in 1957. This was a megaton range weapon that entered service in 1958. Since the first such design had been successfully tested only in November 1957, it may be assumed that these weapons were akin to the U.S. "emergency capability" thermonuclear weapons deployed in 1954. That is, they were thermonuclear systems that would work, and could be delivered, but cut a lot of corners in engineering and military requirements areas like safety, reliability, cost, stockpile life, flexibility, efficiency, etc. The high yield tests of April and September of 1958 may have been in part refinements of this design.
The Yellow Sun Mk 1 warhead was about 4 feet wide and 9 feet long, the whole weapon was 21 feet long. Probably only a few were deployed. The decision to adopt the advanced American Mk-28 thermonuclear weapon design, made in September 1958, brought Yellow Sun Mk 1 manufacture and development to a halt.
Yellow Sun Mk 2/Red Snow
It is believed that this weapon was the British manufactured version of the Mk-28 1 megaton warhead. The first of these was completed in April 1961. The weapon seems to have been the same size as the Yellow Sun Mk 1, even though the Mk-28 is a much smaller weapon. Presumably the Mk-28 warhead itself is what is referred to as "Red Snow", but it was deployed in the Yellow Sun weapons case. This may seem inefficient to use a large heavy case for a small weapon, but in fact it probably minimized force integration effort and cost. Aircraft, trained crews, and handling facilities were all already available to carry the larger weapon after all. It may also have been desirable to conceal the radical reduction in warhead size.
The Yellow Sun Mk 2/Red Snow entered service in 1961. During their initial deployment, they displaced the similar sized Blue Danubes then in service. The Mk 2s remained in service until 1972, when they were phased out by the WE-177. A maximum of 150 were built.
Blue Steel
This was Britain's first nuclear missile. The Blue Steel was a liquid fuel air-to-surface strategic missile, carried by the British strategic "V-bombers" - the Vulcan B.2A and Victor B.2R. The missile began development in 1956, and entered service December 1962 with full operational status being achieved during 1963. The last Blue Steel was w1thdrawn from Victor squadron service at the end of 1968, and from Vulcan service at the end of 1970. Originally a large 200 Kt fission warhead was planned, but this was later changed to a thermonuclear warhead with a yield of 1 megaton or more. This warhead was most likely an adapted Mk-28. About 57 of the missiles were ordered, and about 40 were deployed
The Blue Steel was 10.7 m long, had a wing span of 4.0 m, and weighed 6800 kg. It traveled at up to Mach 2.5, with a maximum range of approximately 200 km. The missile used in inertial navigation system that provided an accuracy of 100-700 yards (CEP).
WE 177
The WE 177 free-fall bomb was Britain's last air-delivered nuclear weapon. With its retirement in March 1998, the UK no longer had any aircraft carried nuclear capability. This bomb was produced in three versions - the relatively high yield strategic A and B versions (200-400 Kt), and the lower yield tactical C version (approx. 10 Kt). The A and B versions entered service with the RAF in 1966, the C version was deployed by the Royal Navy in 1971 as a strike/depth bomb. The retirement of the C version was announced in June 1992. The origin of the WE 177 is not clear. It is believed to be based on American designs, most likely the B-61 if it is indeed a single basic design. It has been suggested that the C version may be a different design from the A and B versions, in which case the B-57 is a plausible candidate for this version. U.S. documents indicate that in 1961 Britain had plans to produce B-57 variants.
The WE 177A weighed 272 kg (600 lb) and had a maximum yield of 200 Kt, the WE 177B weighed 431 kg (950 lb) and had a maximum yield of 400 Kt. Both weapons were variable yield designs. Although they were both one-point safe, they lacked insensitive high explosive or fire-resistant pits. Both variant were parachute retarded for low level delivery and could be used in laydown mode (time delayed detonation on the ground).
Quantity production of the WE 177 was delayed until the 1970s due to the production demands of the Polaris warhead which ended in 1969. Deployment was completed by the late 70s. The WE 177 was retired from service in March 1998, and dismantling was completed by the end of August 1998.
Polaris Warhead
There is some confusion about whether there were really two Polaris warheads (that is, "physics packages") or only one. The initial deployment of the three warhead A3T Polaris SLBM was accompanied by the production and deployment of a British-produced warhead, apparently a version of the American W-58 200 Kt warhead deployed on the U.S. Polaris A3. Later an update of the Polaris missile force, known as the Chevaline program, was carried out with the modified missiles being re-designated the A3TK. This update included a new bus (upper stage), new RVs, and a sophisticated penetration aid (decoy) package. It is not completely clear whether the existing Polaris warheads were simply repackaged, or whether a completely new model was introduced. Due to Britain's limited weapons development and production capacity it seems likely that the warheads used to equip Chevaline, were based on the preexisting Polaris warheads.
Immediately after the 10 June 1963 decision by the British Admiralty to acquire the next-generation A3T Polaris SLBM (in preference to the A2 version then deployed by the U.S., Aldermaston began full-scale developmental work on the Polaris warhead. The design is said to be completed in the spring of 1966, with production beginning in 1966 or 1967. The "developmental" and "design" work associated with this warhead presumably involved adapting the already proof-tested American W-58 warhead to manufacture in a British plant. The warheads were deployed in Mk-2 RVs purchased from the U.S.
The Polaris A3 was the first multiple warhead missile, equipped with three MRVs (multiple re-entry vehicles). The MRVs were dispersed around a central aiming point, they were not independently targeted. Four Polaris subs of the Resolution class were deployed, each with 16 missiles. It is believed that only 144 warheads (plus possibly some spares) were manufactured, enough to equip three subs at a time. The fourth boat was in port for maintenance and refitting at any given time.
Two mid-life update programs were instituted for the Polaris missile. The first and best known was the Chevaline program. It began in secret (as is true of all British nuclear programs) in the late sixties when the Soviet Union began deploying an ABM system around Moscow. Although this system eventually turned out to be very limited in scope, concern about the continuing potency of the British deterrent developed and proposals were made to develop a countermeasure system to improve the ability for Polaris to penetrate these defenses. The program was not an original British undertaking, but was based on a classified U.S. program called Antelope which had made available to the UK in 1967. Studies of the concept were made in 1967, by 1969 the Chevaline concept was defined, and by 1972 the system had been worked out in detail.
Chevaline was a complex system was based on the coordination of the 16 missiles on a single submarine, maneuver by the RVs to elude interceptors, along with multiple decoy re-entry vehicles, and hardening of the warhead against ABM weapon effects. Each missile would fly a different trajectory so that all missiles would arrive simultaneously over the target (Moscow) and release two real warheads (reduced from the three of the AT3) plus four decoy RVs, and a large number of decoy balloons. The defense would be presented with 96 simultaneous maneuvering targets to intercept (even after the balloon decoys burned up). The system proved far more difficult to develop and deploy than expected.
The first Chevaline warhead was tested 23 May 1974 (possibly designated the TK-100). The public disclosure occurred on 24 January 1980 during a debate in Parliament. Sea trials of Chevaline were conducted in November 1980. Production of the Chevaline warhead ran from 1979-1982 with 100 warheads being produced. Chevaline went on patrol for the first time mid-1982 with deployment completed in 1987. The estimated yield of the Chevaline is 225 kt.
The second update program for Polaris involved remanufacture of the solid fuel motors. This program began in 1981, and led to the installation of new motors in all missiles during 1986-87.
Trident Warhead
The first batch of British Trident warheads were completed in September 1992. They were designed by the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) at Aldermaston, and are assembled at Aldermaston and Burghfield. The warheads are though to have similar characteristics to the U.S. W-76 now on U.S. Trident I and II missiles. Production of this warhead was probably halted in March 1998, with the issuing of the 1998 Strategic Defense Review that scaled back Britian's nuclear deterrent posture.
The British Trident warheads are capable of selective yield, ranging from under a kiloton up to the full yield of 100 Kt or so (this appears to differ from U.S. SLBM warheads). Yields are probably 0.3 Kt, 5-10 Kt and 100 Kt.
7.2.3.3 The Current British Nuclear Weapon Stockpile
Given the historical paucity of information provided by the British government on its nuclear arsenal, precise estimates of its size have been difficult to make. In recent years the British had trimmed their nuclear arsenal to just two types of nuclear weapons: the WE177 A/B bomb (200-400 Kt) and the Trident missile warhead (100 Kt).
In March 1998, after 10 months of work, a comprehensive Strategic Defense Review was completed. As part of this review, a major reduction in Britian's nuclear arsenal and posture was declared. Effective immediately all WE177 bombs were removed from service, and all of them (175 WE 177 A and B bombs - with yields of 200 and 400 Kt) were dismantled by the end of August. This leaves only a single nuclear weapon system in service - the Trident submarine.
This system too was significantly scaled back. The final seven Trident II missiles that had been planned were cancelled (saving 50 million pounds and writing off another 40 million), leaving the UK with a total missile inventory of 58. The number of submarines on patrol at any given time was reduced to one, and the number of warheads deployed on a submarine was reduced to 48 (identical to the force loading on its previous Polaris fleet). The SDR also announced that Britain would hold its arsenal to "a stockpile of fewer than 200 operationally available warheads". The UK was already believed to have fewer than 200 Trident warheads, although the number could have eventually gone as high as 248 under previous MoD directives. As of the fall of 1998 Trident warhead production is still apparently on-going but should wrap up soon, perhaps early in 1999. In keeping with the reduced operational tempo, only a single crew for each submarine will be maintained. The SDR further declares that "the submarines will routinely be at a 'notice to fire' measured in days rather than the few minutes quick reaction alert that we sustained throughout the Cold War."
The SDR points out that the implied arsenal of 192 warheads "is a reduction of a third from the maximum of 300 announced by the previous government and represents a reduction of more than 70% in the potential explosive power of the deterrent since the end of the Cold War".
The SDR confirmed plans for the Royal Navy to complete the construction of four Vanguard-class nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). The first submarine of the class, the HMS Vanguard, went on its first patrol in December 1994. The second, the Victorious, entered service in December 1995. The Vigilant was launched in October 1995, and was expected to enter service in the summer or fall of 1998. The final sub, the Vengeance, is under construction with an estimated launch date of 1998, with service likely in late 2000 or early 2001. THE SDR anticipates keeping this force in service for at least 30 years.
The 58 missile bodies being procured are fewer than the 64 required to completely equip all four boats, so rotating missiles between submarines will be required. But since only one Trident submarine will be on patrol at any given time, it will be easy to have one submarine out of service - undergoing refitting and maintenance - at any given time, requiring only 48 missiles for the three active boats. This is similar to the practice the UK followed with its previous submarine fleet, the Resolution class Polaris missile subs. The UK produced only enough warheads for three of the four boats, so that warheads were rotated from boats in port to ones that were setting out on patrol. Typically two Trident submarines may be at sea at any given time, one going or coming back from patrol while the other is on duty.
The Trident II missiles are not actually owned outright by the UK. Instead the Trident II missiles belong to a pool of missiles managed by the United States and stored at Kings Bay, Georgia. British boats pick up their load of missiles at Kings bay when they are commissioned and exchange them there when missiles need servicing. The Trident warheads are mated to the missiles on-board the submarine at the Royal naval Armament Depot at Coulport.
Although the average number of warheads per missile will be 48, the actual distribution of warheads on missiles is uncertain. Beginning in 1996 the UK adopted the strategy of "sub-strategic deterrence". This is basically the same idea as the U.S. policy of "flexible response". It entails having a range of nuclear options, especially limited ones. Some Trident missiles are thus downloaded to a single warhead so that it is possible to launch a strike without using multiple warheads, others will thus have a higher loading. The Trident warheads also offer multiple yields - probably 0.3 Kt, 5-10 Kt and 100 Kt - by choosing to fire the unboosted primary, the boosted primary, or the entire "physics package". According to the 1996 Defence White Paper this policy will become fully operational when the Vigilant goes into service.
Active British Stockpile: End of 1998
The approximate composition of the British stockpile was:
WARHEAD/WEAPON FIRST YIELD NUMBER TOTAL YIELD (MAX)
PRODUCED (Kt) Mt Equiv. Mt
Trident MIRV 1992 100 192 19.2 41.4
GRAND TOTAL 192 19.2 41.4
Active British Forces: End of 1998
DELIVERY VEHICLE DATE NUMBER RANGE (km)/ WARHEAD LOAD TOTAL
DEPLOYED PAYLOAD (kg)
SUBMARINE-BASED MISSILES
Trident II D-5 1994 58 7400/2800 1-6 x MIRV 192
7.2.3.4 British Nuclear Installations
In the United Kingdom nuclear weapons development, acquisition and deployment now occurs entirely within the organizational structure of the Ministry of Defense (MoD). The organization within the MoD responsible for the development, manufacture, and servicing of nuclear weapons is the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE), which is under the authority of the Procurement Executive of the MoD. The AWE came into existence on 1 September 1987 through the merger of the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment (AWRE) at Aldermaston, and the Directorate of Atomic Weapons Factories (aka the Royal Ordnance Factories, or ROF) at Burghfield and Cardiff. Prior to its transfer to the MoD in 1973, the AWRE had been under the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority since 1954.
AWE Aldermaston
This is the central facility of the British nuclear weapon establishment. It is located at Aldermaston, near Reading, in Berkshire. This facility not only performs most research activities, it also develops weapon designs, and manufactures the majority of weapon components, including nuclear components. It was officially established 1 April 1950 on the site of a World War II airfield. Weapons development work was transferred there from the codenamed "High Explosive Research" (HER) project at Fort Halstead in Kent. The AWE employs about 5000 people.
The facility at Aldermaston covers 880 acres and is broken up into 11 areas. The main administration building is F6.1 in the F area. Area A is known as the Citadel, it occupies the north side of the site and includes the plutonium manufacture and pit fabrication facilities. The A1 plutonium manufacturing buildings were the original fabrication facilities that opened in the early to late 50s. They became badly contaminated in 1978 and were closed, but were reopened in 1982 to manufacture the Chevaline warheads. Operation continued long after its planned closing date, and it manufactured the first Trident warheads. The replacement A90 complex began construction in 1983 and after many delays went into operation in 1991 (5 years late). The A90 complex has 300 glove-box production units, and now handles Trident plutonium component production.
AWE Aldermaston is organized into three major departments relating to weapons development: the Warhead Physics Department, the Warhead Design Department, and the Materials Department.
The Warhead Physics Department is responsible for research and analysis of the fundamental physical processes involved in nuclear weapons. It is divided into the Mathematical Physics Division (conducts theoretical work and computer modelling and simulation), the Warhead Hydrodynamics Division (conducts experimental work in the processes of weapon assembly and disassembly), the Radiation Physics Division (conducts experimental work in both nuclear radiation physics and radiation hydrodynamics), and the Foulness Division (conducts explosive experiments at Foulness in Essex).
The Warhead Design Department develops the complete nuclear weapon design. It is divided into the Weapon Engineering Division ("physics package" design), the Weapon Diagnostics Division (system testing for EMP and nuclear hardening, etc.), and the Electronic Systems Division (fuzing and arming systems development).
The Materials Department develops the materials and processes required to design and manufacture nuclear weapons. It is divided into the Chemistry and Explosives Division, the Chemical Technology Division, and the Metallurgy Division.
AWE Burghfield
The Royal Ordnance Factory (ROF), Burghfield (now AWE Burghfield) was established in 1954 as the final assembly plant for nuclear weapons (the British equivalent of Pantex). It is located 5 miles southwest of Aldermaston and covers 265 acres, although since 1976 it has been omitted from all British maps. It employs some 600 people. Many of the non-nuclear components of nuclear weapons are manufactured at Burghfield - including electronic components, and various casing and component packaging materials. At any given time a number of weapons may be stored there for servicing or disassembly.
AWE Cardiff
Located in Llanishen, 3 miles north of Cardiff, Wales, AWE Cardiff has been involved in nuclear weapon component production since at least 1963. It has a work force of 400 and specializes in high precision components and complex assemblies. Essential parts of thermonuclear weapons, and beryllium/U-238 tampers for fission primaries are manufactured there. Up to 50 tons of depleted uranium may be stored on site. In 1987 AWE Cardiff used 2300 kg of beryllium. Servicing/disassembly of nuclear weapon components also occurs at the facility.
AWE Foulness
This is a 2000 acre test range located on remote Foulness Island on the northern edge of the Thames estuary near Shoeburyness. High explosive tests are conducted
at the range, both for weapons development and safety, and to simulate nuclear weapon blast effects.
Sellafield/Windscale/Calder Hall
The main plutonium production site in the United Kingdom is at Sellafield (renamed Windscale when the reactor facility was first built, but now reverted to the original name Sellafield) in north-west England, located on the Cumbrian coast of the Irish Sea. Two 100 MW air-cooled graphite-moderated natural uranium plutonium production reactors (the Windscale Piles) were built there starting in 1950. The first reactor went critical in October 1950, the second in June 1951. These Piles operated until Windscale Pile No. 1 caught fire on 7 October 1957. The fire burned for five days, releasing tens of thousand of curies of radioiodine, and 240 curies of polonium-210 which was being manufactured in the reactor for weapon neutron initiators. During the 11 reactor-years of combined operation these piles produced about 385 kg of weapon-grade plutonium.
Starting in 1956 four more reactors were built at Sellafield - the Calder Hall (CH) Magnox reactors. The Calder Hall reactors entered service between October 1956 and May 1959. These were 180 MW carbon-dioxide cooled reactors with a dual-purpose: they could produce both weapons grade plutonium and electricity. Weapons grade plutonium production tends to interfere with the most economical production of electricity (requiring more uranium for fuel, longer shut down times, and more spent fuel handling), so they were not operated continuously for weapons grade plutonium production. Weapons plutonium production appears to have occurred during 1956-64, the late 1970s, and the mid-late 1980s. These reactors were uprated (as were the identical Chapelcross reactors) to 240 MW in the 1960s, and then downrated slightly in the 1970s.
Sellafield is also the location of British fuel reprocessing facilities, now operated by British Nuclear Fuels Limited (BNFL). The original plant employed the Butex separation process and went into operation on 25 February 1952. The first billets of impure plutonium were produced 31 March 1952. There are now two main plants - the older B205 facility used for Magnox fuel and the newer THORP (thermal oxide reprocessing plant) facility which handles only civilian fuel and is safeguarded. The B205 plant has a capacity of 1,500 tonnes of spent fuel per year , compared to 1,200 tonnes/year for THORP.
Chapelcross
Four more military production reactors, identical to the Calder Hall models but designated "CX", are located at Annan, near Dumfries on Solway Firth in south-west Scotland. Although these reactors have been used for plutonium production, they are also the principal source of tritium for the UK. Although Britain is known to have produced kilogram quantities of tritium before 1970 (6,7 kg of it were exported to the U.S.) the initiation of tritium production at Chapelcross was announced in April 1976. Tritium has apparently been purchased from the U.S. at certain times.
Total Plutonium Production
In addition to the militarized nuclear reactors mentioned above, prior to 1969 spent fuel was diverted from other civilian nuclear reactors as well. Attempting to estimate British weapons plutonium production from these many sources is quite difficult. The best estimates have been made by Albright, Berkhout, and Walker in Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996, SIPRI Press. Their net estimate is that Britain produced 3.6 tonnes of weapon grade plutonium in reactors (using fuel burnups of 400-800 megawatt-days/tonne) +/- 0.5 tonnes. About 0.5 tonnes has been effectively lost through reprocessing waste, expenditures in tests, and transfers to the United States. Another 8.7 tonnes of fuel or reactor grade plutonium is also in military inventory.
A British nuclear industry report on plutonium holdings for 1995 showed that British Nuclear Fuels PLC held a total 85 tonnes tonnes of civilian plutonium. 54 tonnes are owned by UK utilities and 31 tonnes owned by BNFL or its overseas customers. Of this 85 tonnes, 39.5 tonnes remains in spent fuel. Only 66 kg was listed as being in MOX fuel exported, none in MOX stock. All separated plutonium had more than 15% Pu-240. The military plutonium stockpile was given as 4.5 tonnes held in various forms by the UK Atomic Energy Authority.
Capenhurst
Britain's indigenous supply of enriched uranium is supplied by the gaseous diffusion plant at Capenhurst, originally the site of a Royal Ordnance factory, 25 miles from Risley in Cheshire. Although an enrichment plant was authorized in October 1946, the site was not selected until early 1950. Capenhurst made its initial start up in February 1952, but did not successfully enter operation until 1953 (producing low enriched uranium), and did not produce highly enriched uranium (HEU) until 1954. The plant was given successive upgrades during the fifties, reaching a military significant capacity of 125 kg of highly enriched uranium a year in 1957, and much higher levels in 1959 (as much as 1600 kg/yr, or an enrichment capacity of 325,000 SWU/yr). Capenhurst operated as a source of HEU at full capacity only until the end of 1961. Most of the stages were shut down at that point and the plant converted to low-enriched uranium production for civil reactor use. The 1996 SIPRI estimate was 3.8-4.9 tonnes of HEU being produced, almost all of it in 1959-1961.
The original gaseous diffusion plant was dismantled in 1982, and a new gas centrifuge plant was built called Capenhurst A3. This plant has a capacity of 200,000 SWU/yr and has never produced HEU. After start up ion 1984-85 it produced 4.5% enriched uranium for export to the U.S. either for further enrichment to HEU or in exchange for an equivalent amount of HEU. Since 1993 Capenhurst A3 has been operated a